First of all, I don't think there's anything more true than the ol' baseball adage of "nothing makes a manager look smarter than a good bullpen."
But there are a lot of different theories on how to use a bullpen optimally, whether the bullpen in question is spectacular or league-average. While it may sound like a cliche, I think the best way to manage a bullpen is to put the most relievers in roles in which they have the best opportunity to succeed. It sounds trite, but in order to explain, let's use the example of the Cubs' current bullpen situation.
When Ryan Dempster hit the DL with an oblique strain in June, the Cubs had a closer's role to fill, and they called on Bob Howry. While Howry performed admirably during this month-long span, Carlos Marmol became a revelation. He was the first guy Lou Piniella called on in just about every high-leverage situation, no matter the hitter. Marmol has become the Cubs’ best reliever since his callup, by just about any measure.
Many fans clamored for Marmol to become the Cubs' closer (and he may eventually become a dominant one), but making a decision like this comes with some blowback. When guys change roles, many of them are not the same pitcher. When Dempster returns, putting him in a vastly different role carries a risk factor that greatly outweighs the benefits of Marmol adjusting to higher pressure and a higher profile, and Dempster finding security and maintaining focus as a bridge-man or setup guy.
Dempster hasn't been lights-out during his career as Cubs closer, but adequate? Absolutely, and he’s been very good this season. When a pitcher becomes successful, or heck, even adequate in a bullpen role, why mess with that? Your "best guy" doesn't have to be your closer, and your "second-best guy" doesn't have to be setup man. Just find the nearest comfort-zone for each reliever. It's a conservative approach, but you've only got six months to piece it together.
The other thing I love concerning bullpen usage is when managers maintain a state of suspicious alertness to the guy on the mound, and preempt something bad happening, no matter how unorthodox the preemption might appear.
When Bobby Cox yanks Chuck James after five innings, 76 pitches and one earned run allowed, you're thinking, "but wait, he's doing fine, and he still has 24 pitches left to throw!" But Cox knows that if he lets a two-pitch pitcher like James go through the lineup a third or fourth time, a single, bunt, error and a double later, the Braves will be down 3-2 and he'll have a circus show on his hands. Cox keeps the game in his control (and if it gets out of control, he goes out there and gets run, which, in all seriousness, still influences the game by stunting its natural rhythm).
In Jim Leyland's case, every week it seems he's pulling a pitcher in mid-count, before that next pitch gets clobbered, or before two more balls are thrown and a guy gets a free pass. Just about every other manager allows those at-bats to "play themselves out," thinking that "he'll find it out there." Leyland acts. First instinct.
--Tom Koch-Weser
Putting relievers in roles in which they are most likely to succeed is a winning ticket for a big league manager. It’s a managerial method that also can be used to deflect criticism by beat writers and baseball fans. If the designated closer blows a two-run lead in the ninth inning, the skipper is less likely to be second-guessed, because the man who’s supposed to get the job done was on the mound.
Having relievers designated for the seventh, eighth and ninth innings is a wonderful approach for teams with solid bullpens that have adequate depth to limit relievers to a single inning of work or less. Managers of teams with less successful pens often need be more creative and instinctual, and less dependent on designated roles.
Sometimes even good teams with set roles in the pen could benefit from more creative thinking by their manager. Occasionally in a close game, you see a setup man strike out the side or keep batters from hitting a ball hard in the eighth inning. Yet, he gives way in the ninth to the closer, who isn’t always as successful as the guy who worked the eighth. Of course, if the setup man stays in the game and blows a save, the manager knows he’ll be second-guessed, even though the decision looked good heading into the final frame.
Instinctual decisions by Cox and Leyland sometimes pay off and sometimes they don’t, but they have the guts to act on their instincts. Both have been very successful at taking teams to the postseason.
There are dependable relievers who are unable mentally to succeed in the ninth inning. How many? That’s nearly impossible to determine, but most pitchers who have made it to the major leagues have pitched under pressure at various times in their career. If they have the stuff to retire three batters in the seventh inning, they are capable of doing it two innings later.
Calling on a bullpen by committee, even if it’s not in a strict sense, would give a manager more options when his preferred ninth-inning guy has been overworked. Or a key reliever is injured. The preferred closer could be called into a one-run game in the seventh inning if runners are in scoring position. Sometimes the game is on the line long before the ninth, and the guy who works the ninth faces an easier situation.
Few managers are inclined to try this approach. Ideas often are embraced or shunned by managers without proof of their success or failure. Sure, the Boston Red Sox unsuccessfully tried the Bill James theory of a full-scale committee a few years ago, and abandoned it quickly when that particular group of relievers didn’t handle role changes well. That was a high-profile attempt to put a theory into practice, but it’s just one attempt -- a very small sample size.
Pitchers will be resistant to this kind of change, and perhaps that attitude affected how the Boston experiment played out. It may be a long time before another contender gives it a chance, even if it has more than one or two relievers with the skills to consistently get hitters out.
Teams with deep pens can designate roles and stick to them all season. Clubs lacking depth or facing a run of injuries could benefit from a more creative approach that includes calling on your best pitcher whenever the game is on the line. Guys like Cox and Leyland prefer set roles, but they’re not afraid to make decisions based on gut feelings. Managers with less talent should test new approaches that are less conventional, even if they are second-guessed for following their instincts.
--Thom Henninger
